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ABSTRACT
The article provides a tentative reading of Hegel’s police as a concept 
that constitutes a crucial test for the rationality of Hegel’s state and that 
actually played a very important role in the formation of his model of 
rationality. It starts by considering some significant changes in Hegel’s 
approach to the subject in the Jena period, especially in reference to 
Fichte and Spinoza; then, it presents Hegel’s conception of the police as 
the interface of the universal in his mature political philosophy, together 
with his treatment of the disturbing problem of poverty and the rabble; 
and to conclude, it adds some general remarks on Hegel’s police, then 
and now.
In the Elements of Philosophy of Right, Hegel closes his highly original treatment of 
civil society with a section called “Police and Corporation.” But unlike the corpo-
ration, which has managed to gain substantive scholarly attention in recent years, 
Hegel’s conception of the police is rarely discussed. 
Two reasons can be adduced to explain this strange absence. On the one hand, 
and despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Hegel is still often associated 
with the repressive state he allegedly supported in the case of Prussia. Thus, while 
the recent political developments helped to renew genuine interest in his corpora-
tions, designed, precisely, to curb the disintegrative tendencies of modern markets, 
the very fact that he accorded a prominent place in his state to the police seems to 
validate the perception of him as an enemy of the open society. On the other hand, 
and in accordance with the practice of his time, Hegel used the term “police” in a 
much wider sense than is common today. Nowadays we tend to forget that even 
for early Smith, for instance, police included everything relating to “the opulence 
of the state” (Smith 1896: 3), and that his famous example of the pin-factory was 
first presented under the heading of “police.” What is more, since the semantic 
shift in this case was so significant, it was a longstanding habit to translate Hegel’s 
“Polizey” as “public authority,” so that at least in English there was no Hegel’s po-
lice to examine at all.
KEYWORDS
G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. 
Fichte, political 
philosophy, social 
philosophy, political 
economy, civil society, 
police, welfare state, 
corporation
UDK: 321.01:141.7 Hegel
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901101K
Original Scientific Article
Received: 16.10.2018. Accepted: 05.12.2018.
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196
Zdravko Kobe: Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana; 
zdravko.kobe@guest.arnes.si.
THE INTERFACE OF THE UNIVERSAL: ON HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF THE POLICE102 │ ZDRAVKO KObE
In the present article, we intend to show that this neglect was false. Whatever 
the words, we will try to demonstrate that for Hegel, the police must be treated as 
a concept—a concept that, in a sense, constitutes a crucial test for the rationality 
of Hegel’s state and that actually played a very important role in the formation of 
his model of rationality. In what follows, we will first consider some significant 
changes in Hegel’s approach to the subject in the Jena period, especially in refer-
ence to Fichte and Spinoza; then, we will present Hegel’s conception of the police 
in his mature political philosophy; and finally, we will conclude with some general 
remarks on Hegel’s police in relation both to other treatments of the subject in his 
time as well as to problems that appeared in this respect in ours.1 
I
In his treatment of the police, Hegel could benefit from the rich tradition of Po-
lizeiwissenschaft, which stretched back to at least von Justi. But it was especially 
his immediate predecessor Fichte who elevated the police into a prominent phil-
osophical theme. In the Foundations of Natural Right Fichte asked, “What is the 
police?” and tried to “deduce its concept” (Fichte 2000: 254). His first answer was 
that it constitutes “a special connection link between the executive power and the 
subjects” (ibid.). As we shall see, Hegel in a sense subscribed to this definition. How-
ever, when the question of the specific “duties and limits” of the police is raised, a 
huge difference between the two philosophers emerges right from the beginning. 
In Fichte’s well-ordered state, the police turns out to be omnipresent. It is not 
merely that, as he famously proposed, every person should carry an identity card 
with his or her picture inside, so that the police could identify anyone on the spot, 
or that bills of exchange should be printed on special paper accessible exclusive-
ly to state authorities, which would make counterfeiting virtually impossible. In 
order to protect citizens from crime in an effective way, the police should, Fichte 
claims, also put major emphasis on the prevention of transgressions and direct its 
activities not only against actual injuries but also against their very possibility. “Po-
lice law prohibits actions that, in and of themselves, do not harm anyone and ap-
pear entirely neutral, but that make it easier for someone to injure others” (Fichte 
2000: 256). Fichte’s typical example was street lighting, which prevents darkness, 
which, as we know, fosters all kinds of dubious activities. The final objective of po-
lice regulations is thus to establish a transparent order that would render unlawful 
actions materially impossible (see Chamayou 2015: 8).
In a state with the kind of constitution we have established here, every citizen has 
his own determinate status, and the police know fairly well where each one is at ev-
ery hour of the day, and what he is doing. Everyone must work and has, if he works, 
enough to live on … In such a state crime is highly unusual and is preceded by a 
certain unusual activity. In a state where everything is ordered and runs according 
to plan, the police will observe any unusual activity and take notice immediately. 
(Fichte 2000: (262–263)
1  I would like to thank Luca Illetterati, Pierpaolo Cesaroni, and Petar Bojanić for valu-
able comments on the first draft of this paper.
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Hegel, for his part, held a different view. Even before he definitely formed his 
own conception of the police, he was clearly opposed to so tightly ordered a so-
ciety. In his very first publication in 1801, he attacked Fichte’s “preventive intel-
lect and its coercive authority, the police,” together with its tendency to engage in 
“endless determinations” (GW 4: 56; Hegel 1977: 146–147), and openly ridiculed 
Fichte’s control freakiness in a long footnote: “In Fichte’s state every citizen will 
keep at least another half dozen busy with supervision, etc., … and so on ad infini-
tum” (GW 4: 57; Hegel 1977: 148). Later, in the unpublished fragments on the Ger-
man constitution, probably written in 1802/03, he commented in a similar vein:
It is … a basic prejudice of those recent theories which have been partially translat-
ed into practice that a state is a machine with a single spring which imparts move-
ment to all the rest of its infinite mechanism, and that all the institutions which the 
essential nature of a society brings with it should emanate from the supreme polit-
ical authority and be regulated, commanded, supervised, and directed by it. (GW 5: 
174; Hegel 1999: 22)2
In direct opposition to Fichte’s “pedantic craving to determine every detail,” He-
gel claimed that the state should rather establish a clear distinction between what 
is essential to its existence and unity and what can be left to chance and arbitrary 
will. When the “universal political authority demands of the individual only what 
is necessary for itself,” then, Hegel continues, it can in another respect “grant the 
citizens their living freedom and individual will and even leave considerable scope 
for the latter” (GW 5: 167; Hegel 1999: 17–18). Indeed, the state must allow for the 
largest possible sphere under the exclusive discretion of its citizens:
The center, as the political authority and government, must leave to the freedom of 
the citizens whatever is not essential to its own role of organising and maintaining 
authority … and … nothing should be so sacred to it as the approval and protection 
of the citizens’ free activity in such matters, regardless of utility; for this freedom is 
inherently sacred. (GW 5: 175; Hegel 1999: 23)
This, then, could stand as our first finding: Fichte, a philosopher of the Thathan-
dlung, who elevated freedom into a fundamental ontological principle, designed 
a political system of meticulous policing of everyday life, while Hegel, at least in 
this respect, advocated minimal police.
It is worth noting that in Hegel’s view, Fichte’s regulation frenzy was a neces-
sary consequence—that is, a symptom—of his fundamental ontological dualism. 
Because he constructed an unbridgeable divide between the realm of nature and 
the realm of reason, he was unable to conceive how reason could be effective with-
in nature itself, and was consequently forced to treat the not completely rational 
beings as essentially irrational. Because he could not rely on their immanent ratio-
nality, he was forced to prescribe the demands of reason as something imposed on 
them from the outside. In this way, the task proved to be infinite, involving ever 
more pedantic regulations, as “there is simply no action at all from which a conse-
quent understanding of this state could not calculate some possible damage to the 
2  The translation into practice obviously refers to the French Revolution. Indeed, a large 
part of the critique of the French revolutionary project that Hegel presents in the Phenom-
enology of Spirit can be read as a summary of the argument against Fichte’s police. 
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others” (GW 4: 56; Hegel 1977: 146). And in this way, the state was inevitably con-
verted into nothing “but a machine” (GW 4: 58; Hegel 1977: 149)—the character-
istic of the mechanism being that everything in it is determined by a foreign law.
Indeed, as we were already able to observe, Hegel typically criticized Fichte’s 
conception of the state as mechanistic3 and initially even rejected the state as in-
herently mechanical. In the Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism, com-
posed together with his romanticizing friends Schelling and Hölderlin in 1797/98, 
he wrote that the ideas of freedom and the state exclude each other. “Every state 
must treat free human beings like mechanical work; and it should not do that; there-
fore it should cease” (GW 2: 615; Behler 1987: 161). At that point, Hegel was con-
vinced that the ideal political organization was actually realized in the city-state of 
antiquity, where every individual was animated by the spirit of the community so 
that the particular and the universal purely and simply coincided.4 In his idealized 
view, the Greek polis was living, it was organic, not mechanical, as every citizen 
existed only within the whole and for the whole; and it was beautiful, as there was 
no outside constraint needed, and everyone did what was required spontaneous-
ly, out of immediate feeling and without having to rely on general prescriptions.
However, after Hegel moved to Jena this ideal of beautiful totality soon lost its 
luster. If in the Differenzschrift he still alluded to “the true infinity of a beautiful 
community” (GW 5: 55; Hegel 1977: 146), he later gradually came to realize that the 
Greek beauty was possible only on condition that individuality was suppressed. In 
the happy freedom of the Greeks, Hegel now observes, 
no protesting takes place there; everyone knows himself immediately as universal; 
that is, he renounces to his particularity, without knowing it as such, as this self, as 
the essence. (GW 8: 262)
The beautiful classical polis was premised on the refusal of particularity.5 For that 
reason, it was not only beautiful but also fragile. As soon as a subject appeared in 
its midst, a subject prepared to insist on her particularity all the way down, as was 
the case with Antigone, the beautiful totality was bound to disintegrate. And this 
was no deplorable coincidence that could be avoided, but a manifestation of what 
Hegel now considered an inherent weakness of Greek ethical life. Hegel liked to 
observe that in a state where no law was ever broken, one could never tell if it was 
valid at all. Perhaps it just happened that no one bothered to do something against 
it. This explains why a venerable and apparently solid institution may sometimes 
all of a sudden fall to pieces. Again, the law proves its existence only when, upon 
3  Following Lauth’s seminal book, it has become commonplace to remark how partial, 
even distorted Hegel’s early critique of Fichte was. This reservation, however, does not 
seem to apply to Hegel’s early critique of Fichte’s political philosophy: there are very few 
studies on Hegel’s critique of Fichte’s police and they tend to side with Hegel (see, for in-
stance, Vieweg 2018). This may not be trivial.
4  For a closer presentation of Hegel’s early conceptions of harmonious Greek commu-
nity, see, for instance, Avineri (Avinieri 1972: 20f.). 
5  “Confronted by this idea, his own individuality vanished; it was only this idea’s main-
tenance, life, and persistence that he asked for, … Only in moments of inactivity or leth-
argy could he feel the growing strength of a purely self-regarding wish” (GW 1: 368; Hegel 
1971: 155). 
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being violated, it affirms its consequences against infringements and thus veri-
fies its validity. Similarly, a political body establishes its effective strength not by 
keeping its original unity intact, but by allowing for inner divisions and still being 
able to sustain them.
But anyhow, once the principle of subjective particularity has managed to assert 
itself in the modern society, the Greek ideal of the harmonious whole definitely 
lost its appeal. For Hegel, this was the historical accomplishment of Christianity, 
especially in its protestant variety (indeed, in the ancient polis, no protesting took 
place). The Greek ideal is now irrevocably gone. There is no way back. The only 
option left, Hegel claims, is therefore to integrate this “obstinacy that does hon-
our to human beings” into the very structure of the political organization; to open 
the space for the divides and conflicts brought about by the principle of subjective 
particularity and turn them into an animating drive of political life; and to tame 
the destructive forces of the particular by pitching them against one another for 
the greater benefit of the universal.
To formulate this project, Hegel could draw on the work of Schiller, who was 
well-nigh haunted by the idea of building a middle ground between sensibility and 
reason. In On the Aesthetic Education of Man, for instance, he designed an appa-
ratus of esthetic conditioning that would, as it were, mechanically produce moral 
effects. However, of even more valuable importance was probably the fact that at 
that point, namely around 1802, and partly even before, Hegel engaged in a close 
reading of political economists, in particular Steuart, Ferguson, and Smith.6 Not 
only did this “science of our time” show him how under the mass of seemingly 
chaotic events the observing understanding can nonetheless discern stable regu-
larities, it also taught him how, by following only their own particular interests, 
the independent market actors nonetheless produce a result that is supposed to be 
universally desired. In what Smith called the “invisible hand,” Hegel immediate-
ly detected the decisive conceptual lesson that there is understanding immanent 
to the actions of finite rational beings—and transformed it into the figure of the 
“cunning of reason.”
This could constitute our second observation. If Hegel initially conceived of 
social organization along the lines of organic unity exemplified by the Greek polis, 
in Jena he soon abandoned this frictionless ideal for the right of subjective partic-
ularity that demanded an independent ground against the universal. According to 
Hegel, Plato was acute enough to detect the imminent irruption of this dimension 
into Greek ethical life, and it was for this reason that, in his ideal state, he made 
a special provision for a class freed from the burdens of the universal in exchange 
for its “political nullity” (GW 4: 458; Hegel 1999: 151). Although such an inclusion 
of “the non-frees” was bound to fail, it was, Hegel argues, actually a sign of Pla-
to’s modernity. This is significant because he had to confront the proponents of an 
organic community where everyone would be “steadfastly united with the sacred 
bond of friendship” and everything would be done “spontaneously” (GW 14: 9; He-
gel 1991: 15) even in Berlin. In Hegel’s view, it was this idea of political organization, 
6  For Hegel’s reading of the Scots, see the classical study on the subject by Waszek 1988. 
For an authoritative treatment of Hegel’s conception of the market, see Herzog 2013.
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defended for instance by Fries in his “mush of ‘heart, friendship, and enthusiasm’” 
(GW 14: 10; Hegel 1991: 16), that was outdated and dangerous.
It is interesting to note that Hegel’s infatuation with the beautiful ethical life 
coincided at least in part with his defense of the metaphysics of absolute identi-
ty, which he and Schelling jointly developed in the early Jena years. In the unpub-
lished System of Ethical Life, for instance, probably composed in 1802, Hegel writes:
Thus in the ethical life the individual exists in an eternal mode; his empirical being 
and doing is something downright universal; for it is not the individual which acts 
but the universal absolute spirit in him. Philosophy’s view of the world and neces-
sity, according to which all things are in God and there is nothing singular, is per-
fectly realized for the empirical consciousness, since every singularity of action or 
thought or being has its essence and meaning simply and solely in the whole. (GW 
5: 314; Hegel 1979: 143)
“Philosophy’s view of the world and necessity” obviously refers to the meta-
physical doctrine of Spinoza, which, as Hegel implies, also embodies true organic 
freedom. From this perspective, therefore, Spinoza coincides with the beauty of the 
Greeks! Hegel was soon to abandon this Spinoza-inspired philosophy of identity, 
however. And surprisingly enough, everything suggests that this happened precise-
ly under the peculiar influence of Spinoza. As it was convincingly demonstrated by 
Chiereghin, in 1802 Hegel happened to read both the Tractatus theologico-politicus 
and the Tractatus politicus.7 He became acquainted with a different Spinoza, who, 
while inquiring into human actions “in the same unfettered spirit as is habitually 
shown in mathematical studies” (Spinoza 2002: 681) and even daring to identify 
right with might, still explicitly warned against zealous regulation and vehement-
ly affirmed that the state should—in its own interest, to be sure—leave substantial 
room for its citizens’ autonomy.8 Since this is not the place to go into the details, let 
us just remark that the influence of Spinoza’s political thought transpires from ev-
ery page of the last part of the German Constitution.9 Our third observation would 
thus be that Hegel’s distancing himself from Spinozist metaphysics corresponded 
to his accepting some basic tenets of Spinoza’s political philosophy.
All tree moves—the definite rejection of Fichte’s conception of the police, the 
abandonment of the Greek ideal of beautiful political totality, and the disavowal 
7  For a detailed argument see Chiereghin 1980: 96−108.
8  “It must therefore be granted that the individual reserves to himself a considerable part 
of his right, which therefore depends on nobody’s decision but his own.” (TTP, ch. 17; Spi-
noza 2002: 536) “He who seeks to regulate everything by law will aggravate vices rather 
than correct them. What cannot be prohibited must necessarily be allowed.” (TTP, ch. 20; 
Spinoza 2002: 569)
9  For instance, the very insistence on the unity of the state reveals a characteristic fea-
ture of Spinoza, who defined the state as a multitudo una veluti mente ducta. And in addi-
tion to the examples already quoted: “We therefore regard a people as fortunate if the state 
allows it considerable freedom in subordinate activities of a universal kind, and we likewise 
regard a political authority as infinitely strong if it can be supported by a greater spirit of 
freedom, unattained by pedantry, among its people” (GW 5: 178; Hegel 1999: 25). The ex-
pression “glückliches Volk” no longer refers to the Greeks, where the individual vanished, 
but to a system in which the maximum possible sphere was accorded to her free 
initiative. 
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of Schelling’s philosophy of identity—display a similar structure and took place at 
roughly the same time. What exactly was the inner dynamism of this major turn to-
wards Hegel’s characteristic standpoint remains a subject of discussion. No doubt, 
the reasons involved were varied and complex. But on the basis of our three ob-
servations it seems rather safe to assume that an important role in Hegel’s meta-
physical turn was played by political themes, in particular those related to the new 
science of economy and Spinoza’s political philosophy.
This thesis has some interesting consequences. It implies, for instance, that 
Hegel turned away from Spinoza precisely under the sway of Spinoza: it was Spi-
noza’s political philosophy that convinced him of the necessity to treat individ-
uals as independent actors and thus prompted him to abandon Spinoza’s system 
of one universal substance (see Chiereghin 1980: 107). It also implies that Hegel’s 
philosophy is essentially political—political not only according to its content, but 
on account of its very conceptual form. Hegel the metaphysician became Hegel by 
incorporating the political into the structure of his concept! And since one of the 
major thrusts in this transfiguration came from his considerations on the proper 
role of the police, it may be further claimed that for Hegel, the police is not merely 
a concept among concepts. It rather constitutes one of those crucial points where 
the fate of Hegel’s conceptuality as a whole is at stake.
Let us add that the question of the police is closely related to the proper concep-
tualization of the organism and the mechanism. We have seen that the young Hegel 
rejected the state for being inherently mechanical and claimed that we should in-
stead think of society as an organic whole. But we have also seen that Fichte’s state 
and Greek ethical life, both of which pretended to be spontaneous and organic, ac-
tually produced results that were equally rigid (and in this sense mechanic), unable 
to digest any divergence from the prescribed order, and that they were fragile and 
bound to perish. The recent defeat of the French revolutionary project and the his-
torical demise of the Greek polis contained a conceptual lesson for Hegel. In this 
way, it may be said, he realized that a community could be live and organic only to 
the extent it was able to include an aspect of the mechanical. This, however, not 
only requires a different concept of the organic, one that would not merely cease 
to stand in opposition to the mechanical, but also demands a completely reworked 
theory of the mechanism itself. The latter task proved to be the most demanding, 
and it seems that Hegel continued to struggle with it even after the publication of 
the Phenomenology of Spirit. In the end, Hegel conceived the mechanical object 
as an underdetermined contradiction, which was finally resolved only in the con-
ceptual figure of absolute mechanism, which turned determination by an external 
other into self-determination. Only if the mechanism is overcome in its own field 
can the organism incorporate it as its own element. And what mechanism is to or-
ganism, civil society is to the state.10
10  The importance of mechanism for Hegel’s political philosophy was vigorously de-
fended by Ross: “Thus my thesis is that the logical argument concerning how the mechan-
ical object transforms itself into an element of absolute mechanism provides the argumen-
tative schema and justification for Hegel’s account of the way in which an individual is to 
find concrete freedom within the institutions of modern social and political life” (Ross 
2008: 61). See also the contribution by M. Skomvoulis in Buchwalter 2015: 13−34.
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II
Hegel presented his treatment of the police as part of the theory of civil society. 
With him, the latter is an old name for a completely new disposition located in 
between the family (as an immediate ethical community) and the state (as a politi-
cal community in which individuals can only lead a universal life). By introducing 
this middle term Hegel seeks to answer the characteristically modern question: 
How to secure the individual’s right to her particularity without thereby under-
mining the sphere of the universal, or the state (as was the case in the Greek polis)? 
To this effect, he resorted to the figure of self-sacrifice of the universal, which was 
first put forward in his Jena essay on natural right.11 The idea is that the universal, 
or the state, surrenders a part of itself and hands it over to the exclusive authority 
of the particular. Civil society is thus a sphere of the non-political within the po-
litical, a sphere of the merely particular within the universal—a space where indi-
viduals are allowed the rare privilege not to care for the universal and can devote 
themselves entirely and exclusively to pursuing their own particular interests. By 
this, the universal opens a space for the free deployment of the negativity that is 
required for its material existence and, keeping it within the boundaries of civil 
society (see GW 4: 454; Hegel 1999: 146), contains its effects so that they may not 
destabilize the universal.
In civil society, then, the individual acts as an independent self-serving being 
who meets other equally selfish individuals and enters into relations of free nego-
tiation and exchange. For that reason, civil society is best described as a realm of 
economic activity whose laws are exposed in the new science of political economy. 
This civil society is also, and Hegel acknowledges this from the start, a realm of 
arbitrariness and external contingency, which in its opposites “affords a spectacle 
of extravagance and misery as well as the physical and ethical corruption” (EPhR, 
§ 185).12 Hence he calls it “the stage of difference,” describes it as “the world of ap-
pearance of the ethical,” and openly speaks of “the loss of ethical life” (EPhR, § 181). 
But according to Hegel, this is the price to be paid for the particular to get its due, 
and that which actually constitutes the infinite power of the modern state—“which 
allows the opposition of reason to develop to its full strength, and has overcome it” 
(EPhR, § 185R). The only condition is, however, that the particular must not be al-
lowed to develop to such a degree that it would threaten to destroy the very frame 
of the state. Whatever is by nature negative must remain in the negative, as Hegel 
once observed (GW 4: 450; Hegel 1999: 141).
In addition to opening a space for selfish individuals to indulge in themselves, 
civil society performs at least two other functions. First, it assures the material con-
ditions of the ethical community. As a system of needs wherein individuals satis-
fy their particular wants through the division of labor and mutual exchange, civil 
society produces “universal and permanent resources” (EPhR, § 199), which pro-
vides for the subsistence of its members. Hegel did not advocate complete wealth 
11  The figure was first introduced under the label of “the tragedy within the ethical” (GW 
4: 458; Hegel 1999: 151).
12  For practical reasons, Hegel’s Elements of Philosophy of Right will be cited by para-
graph numbers only. The English translation is taken from Hegel 1991.
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equality, to be sure. That would go against the principle of particularity inherent 
to civil society, as well as against the condition that the satisfaction of one’s needs 
should be mediated by one’s own contribution. In Hegel’s view, a member of civil 
society enjoys rather the possibility of sharing in this universal wealth, so that her 
actual share or her own particular resources are always conditional—conditional, 
that is, “upon one’s own immediate basic assets (i.e. capital),” “upon one’s skills,” 
but also on “contingent circumstances” (EPhR, § 200 and § 237). But in spite of 
this unequal distribution, civil society provides for the material basis, which is in 
principle open to all.
And second, as “a system of all-around dependence,” civil society performs a for-
mative task, a task to educate the individuals originally attached to their particular-
ity alone and bring them up towards the universal.13 It is not merely that a member 
of civil society can participate in the production of universal resources only if she 
disposes with certain practical and theoretical knowledge. Of even greater impor-
tance is the fact that within this system of general dependency both the needs and 
the work to satisfy them are inherently abstract. In civil society, need is no longer 
the immediate natural need as exemplified in living beings in general, it is always a 
need mediated by the other’s opinion; and its satisfaction, too, is similarly possible 
only to the extent that it is offered on the market, that is, acknowledged by others. 
In this manner, a tendency to imitate emerges—a tendency commonly known as 
fashion, which, however, as Hegel argues, is no mere sociological phenomenon, 
but rather manifests a structural feature of the very system of needs. The conse-
quence is that both in their needs and their work, individuals turn out to be com-
pletely dependent on this system of all-around dependence: they can realize their 
particularity “only in so far as they themselves determine their knowledge, voli-
tion, and action in a universal way and make themselves links in the chain of this 
interconnection” (EPhR, § 187). The system of needs profits from their selfishness, 
and riding on their particularity, polishes their particularity away. This is the “hard 
work” of cultivation (see EPhR, § 187R) carried out by civil society for the state. 
After these preliminaries, let us now turn to police proper.
As already noted, the role of Hegel’s police is similar to Fichte’s: the police 
serves as a kind of intermediary between the state and civil society, it is a mode in 
which the universal is present within the particular.14 Both in Fichte and in Hegel 
it excludes the administration of justice, which, although it occupies an analogous 
place, is focused more on juridical procedures in the strict sense. The reasons for 
such a division are no doubt traditional as well as conceptual. In Fichte, for in-
stance, it could be said that the administration of justice deals with the actual vio-
lations of law, while the police takes care of the possible ones. But the proper goal 
of Hegel’s police is quite different from that in Fichte: it is determined by the fact 
13  For a closer assessment of Bildung performed by civil society, see A. Buchwalter, “‘Die 
Sittlichkeit in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft’: Entzweiung Bildung und Hegels Aufhebung 
der Aporien der sozialen Moderne” (Schmidt am Busch 2016: 125−151).
14  Using a similar formulation, Bojanić has emphasized the symbolic dimension of the 
police as “the symbol of power of the universal,” and insisted on the need to see it as an 
instance of society’s self-organization. For him, it is the “cause of the police” that holds 
people together; see Bojanić 2018.
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that while Hegel, on the one hand, conceived of civil society as a sphere of sub-
jective freedom, operating according to the logic of the market, he, on the other 
hand, and in sharp contrast to Smith, did not believe the market was a self-regu-
lating device. On this point, Hegel rather aligned with Steuart, the author of An 
Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, who thought that modern markets 
were fragile mechanisms similar to “watches, which are continually going wrong” 
(Steuart 1767: 250). “Sometimes,” he continued, “the spring is found too weak, the 
other times too strong for the machine: and when the wheels are not made accord-
ing to a determined proportion … then the machine stops … and the workman’s 
hand becomes necessary to set it right” (Steuart 1767: 251). Against the myth of the 
invisible hand, Steuart consequently emphasized the need for intervention by the 
visible hand of the statesman. “In treating every question of political economy, I 
constantly suppose a statesman at the head of the government, so as to prevent 
the vicissitudes inherent to the market from hurting the commonwealth” (Steuart 
1767: 120; see also 274). This is not to say that Steuart’s statesman occupies him-
self with every minute detail and determines their right proportions according to 
some centralized plan. In fact, it could be claimed that his main concern is to en-
sure the necessary conditions for market competition to reach a balance by itself, 
and to intervene only when market “excesses” and “violent convulsions” threaten 
to destroy the very framework for the free deployment of market forces (see Steuart 
1767: 207, 344). Moreover, while he encouraged the intervention of the statesman’s 
caring hand in the market, Steuart was also careful to add that he spoke only “of 
governments which are conducted systematically, constitutionally, and by general 
laws” (Steuart 1767: 249). In the end, his conception of the statesman’s regulative 
activities thus turns out to be very close to the view held by German ordoliberals. 
For his part, Hegel justified the role of the police by considering that the system 
of needs provides individuals merely with the possibility to satisfy their needs. This 
immediately implies that their satisfaction is contingent, and that they sometimes 
do and sometimes do not get satisfied. However, since there are some needs that 
are not contingent, but rather necessary—“no man lives on the mere possibility of 
satisfaction,” notes Hegel (GW 26: 992)—it is mandatory that at least with respect 
to such needs their safe satisfaction be guaranteed. In this sense, the police is a body 
whose task it is to limit the sway of contingency in civil society, to fight “precar-
iousness” (see GW 26: 994), to secure the personal welfare of individuals—not as 
a manifestation of compassion, but rather as their positive “right” (EPhR, § 230).
The affirmation is strong! Why should, in civil society, “particular welfare be 
treated as a right and dully actualized”? At first, this could be explained as yet an-
other sign of Steuart’s influence.15 In accordance with the cameralist tradition, 
15  And, of course, of Fichte’s. In Fichte, property rights are established to give the sub-
jects a sufficient external sphere to perpetuate their free activity (that is, essentially, to sat-
isfy their needs), and they are founded on the social contract in which everyone is given 
what is his. “Each person possesses his own property, only insofar as, and on the condition 
that, all citizens are able to live off what belongs to them. If all are not able to do so, then 
each person’s property ceases to be his own, and becomes the property of those who can-
not live on their own.” Therefore, Fichte concludes, “the poor … have an absolute right of 
coercion to such assistance” (Fichte 2000: 186).
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Steuart assigned to the political economy within the state a task similar to the one 
performed by the house economy within the family: it is supposed to care for the 
well-being of all of its members. “The principal object of this science is to secure 
a certain fund of subsistence for all the inhabitants, to obviate every circumstance 
which may render it precarious” (Steuart 1767: 2). However, even if we assume that 
this is indeed the objective of this science, no right corresponds to it on the side 
of those it relates to. If political economy fails to deliver, no one’s right is there-
by violated. 
While Steuart’s view may support Hegel’s reasoning, a different argument is 
therefore needed. It lies in the fact that, for Hegel, civil society is set in a compre-
hensive normative system of the actualization of freedom. On the one hand, Hegel 
defines right as the “existence of the free will” (EPhR, § 29), to which the free will is 
absolutely entitled; on the other hand, civil society represents a special realm with-
in the system in question (EPhR, § 4) that is supposed to give existence to the free 
will in its particularity. “Actuality of freedom is the purpose of civil society” (GW 
26: 138). Insofar as the free will has a right (and, actually, a duty) to exist as partic-
ular, the free will has a right to be part of civil society. Civil society is its right. And 
insofar as civil society is justified only in relation to it, the free will also has rights 
in relation to it, namely in the sense that civil society must be constituted in such 
a way as to facilitate its existence.
More specifically, the individual releases himself from the bonds of the fami-
ly, in which he figured primarily as a member immersed in a natural ethical sub-
stance, and now enters the sphere of civil society as a self-relying being to realize 
his particularity. But instead of gaining his independence, it turns out that he has 
thus become completely dependent on this system of all-around dependency. In 
civil society, as we have seen, the individual can do nothing on his own; he can 
manifest his particularity and satisfy his needs only by finding a slot within this 
system, which stands against him as a vast blind mechanism he can only accom-
modate to. In other words, he now falls into the same dependence on civil society 
he used to find himself in in relation to the family. “Thus, the individual becomes 
a son of civil society,” observes Hegel, “which has claims upon him as he has rights 
in relation to it” (EPhR, § 238). 
As a consequence, Hegel calls civil society “a universal family” (ibid.). In the first 
instance, this designation obviously refers to the care that civil society is obliged 
to provide for those children whose families fail to attend to them properly. But 
as we have seen, there is more to this term: if every member of civil society is its 
son, then, conceptually speaking, civil society constitutes their family, the univer-
sal family of them all. At the same time, the term aptly illustrates at which point 
the structural deadlock of the police as the visible hand of the universal family is 
going to manifest itself. For family is inherently particular; it is the realm of close-
ness, attachment, and love. The universal family thus clearly stands as a contradic-
tion in terms. Moreover, their respective modes of operation are opposite as well: 
while family relations are immediate, particular, and unconditioned, in civil soci-
ety they are inherently mediated, general, and conditioned. This seems to exclude 
in advance that civil society could successfully accomplish the task of the family 
on its own. Indeed, as we shall see, the police is not enough.
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Let us take a closer look. The sphere of activity of the police is in principle de-
fined by its general goal and mode of operation. Its goal is to ensure the smooth 
operation of civil society and to secure its members from contingencies that are 
inconsistent with it. It proceeds in a systematic, “universal,” and “external” way 
(GW 26: 989), displaying no particular attachment. Accordingly, its activities could 
be arranged into five loosely defined categories, which more or less correspond to 
the modern state administration and welfare system.16
The first task of the police is to establish the general framework of civil society. 
This category comprehends maintaining public order and safety, both of persons 
and property, which also includes the prevention and prosecution of crime. This 
is the segment of activities the police has retained up to the present day.
The second task is to secure the special framework required for the proper 
functioning of civil society. This category comprises those activities that are in the 
general interest, but either cannot be organized according to the logic of pure mar-
ket exchange or are such that it is simply more effective for all to be provided by 
one. This includes services that, due to their specific nature, have to be provided 
necessarily and consequently cannot be exposed to market volatilities (such as wa-
ter, food, and energy supply), then infrastructure projects (for instance, roads and 
public lighting), and the determination and supervision of standards that reinforce 
trust and simplify circulation (systems of measurement, minimal standards, various 
certificates, etc.). “These universal functions and arrangements of public utility re-
quire oversight and advance provisions on the part of the public authority,” notes 
Hegel (EPhR, § 235). Education and healthcare may as well belong to this category.
The third group of police activities concerns the economic policy. The primary 
task that falls under this heading is adjusting the “differing” and potentially con-
flicting “interests of producers and consumers,” (EPhR, § 236), that is, supervising 
and regulating the functioning of the market. Hegel acknowledges that in the long 
run and “on the whole,” the correct balance may indeed be established automati-
cally.17 However, the same also holds true for the plague: “it eventually stops,” set-
tles down by itself, “yet in the process hundreds of thousands die” (GW 26: 1401). 
Similarly, Hegel claims, in the event of economic fluctuations the police should 
closely monitor all developments and, by resorting to market interventions, prevent 
instabilities from turning into full-fledged economic crises that could endanger the 
existence of entire industries. This includes, above all, appropriate counter-cyclic 
measures and, most importantly, a finely tuned employment policy wherever the 
greatest dangers loom—all with the purpose to ensure a sustainable economy, as it 
16  For illustration, the Grimm Dictionary, edited in the middle of the nineteenth centu-
ry, comments as follows: “In the most general sense the police is the concern of a state or 
a community (under state authority) for the common good by the means of authority com-
pulsion; according to its range and scope of action, it is divided into a state or provincial 
police, community or local police … administrative, welfare, security, health police, road 
and construction police, etc.; the purpose of the police is actually comfortable living of the 
members of a state.”
17  “When it is said: in general, the balance will always settle itself, this is therefore right. 
But here it is as much about the particular as about the universal; the matter should not be 
made only in general, but the individuals as particularities are the purpose and have enti-
tlement” (GW 26: 992).
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is now called. It must be considered, however, that according to Hegel—and Steuart 
before him—the markets are permanently on the verge of collapse, especially when 
they are dependent on “external circumstances and remote combinations whose 
implications cannot be grasped by the individuals” (EPhR, § 236). Hegel’s police 
would therefore be heavily engaged in this field.
The fourth group of tasks can be subsumed under family policy. This category 
refers to the care and protection of family members, primarily children, in the event 
that the family fails to attend to them properly. When the family lacks the required 
resources, its role is assumed by civil society. This is not all, however, for accord-
ing to Hegel, civil society has to intervene for the benefit of children also in other 
cases when their interest is in jeopardy – intervene, that is, against their parents. 
Hegel’s justification for this is astonishingly modern. In his view, children are not 
the property of their guardians, who are therefore not free to dispose with them ac-
cording to their opinion. On the contrary, children are the future members of civil 
society and the state, and are in this capacity entitled to be equipped with every-
thing needed to perform their future roles. On this ground, they have the positive 
right to obtain proper education, to be nourished and medically treated in their best 
interest, to be vaccinated against dangerous illnesses, and the like. If their guard-
ians act against these rights, the state is obliged to intervene and protect them “in 
the face of arbitrariness and contingency on the part of the parents” (EPhR, § 239).
In addition, the police is also entitled to look over the rational expenditure of 
family resources. As “resources” are no mere “property,” but property endowed with 
the purpose to provide durable and safe means for the needs of all family mem-
bers, they have to be spent accordingly, in their best interest. So, if the person who 
legally disposes with this property happens to use it for his particular interests, or 
in general, and by his “extravagance” destroys the “family’s livelihood,” the state 
has to intervene to protect the family assets.
Finally, there is the welfare policy. Under this category falls the obligation to pro-
vide for all those who are unable to take care of themselves through no fault of their 
own, be it due to health, age, or any contingent circumstance, such as unemployment. 
Hegel’s provisions in this respect are substantial, comparable indeed to the standards 
of the modern welfare state. For instance, he maintained that the state should guar-
antee employment for everyone willing to work, and if it fails to do so, the affected 
person is fully entitled to adequate compensation. Nonetheless, a structural dead-
lock famously emerges here in the case of the long-term unemployed, a deadlock 
that may lead to “the creation of a rabble” and ultimately bring civil society to the 
verge of collapse. For that reason, one of the major tasks of the police is to suppress 
poverty and, in particular, prevent the poor from turning into the rabble, that is, into 
a condition characterized by having lost any attachment to the norms and values 
held by the public, by the “splitting of the mind with civil society” (GW 26: 498).18 
The problem is, famously, that it is precisely on Hegel’s account that the devel-
opment in question is extremely hard to block. On the one hand, poverty is not a 
18  “There is the rich rabble too,” says Hegel (GW 26: 1390). But although the question is 
by no means trivial, in some respects it is even more acute since the rich rabble might be 
a widespread phenomenon in the well-off civil society of today, we will not go into it. For 
a closer discussion, see Vieweg 2012: 331f.
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contingent phenomenon, a consequence of some disruption in the proper opera-
tion of civil society; in Hegel’s view, it appears precisely “when the activity of civ-
il society is unrestricted” (EPhR, § 243), as a byproduct of its very thriving. “The 
emergence of poverty is in general a consequence of civil society and on the whole 
arises necessarily out of it” (GW 26: 496). On the other hand, all the measures tak-
en by the police to prevent it eventually fail: Hegel claims that if the state provides 
jobs for the poor by financing their employment, for instance by engaging in pub-
lic works, it thereby only increases overproduction, which caused the layoffs in the 
first place; and if the state assumes the burden of supporting the poor directly, this 
violates “the principle of civil society” that satisfaction should be conditioned on 
personal contribution and further dishonors the beneficiaries as unable to stand on 
their own—which gives rise to the inner indignation against civil society, that is, to 
the very rabble mentality it was supposed to prevent. Hegel bitterly concludes that,
despite an excess of wealth, civil society is not wealthy enough – i.e. its own distinct 
resources are not sufficient – to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of 
a rabble. (EPhR, § 245)
In the next paragraph, Hegel adds that “this inner dialectic” of civil society “drives 
it … to go beyond itself” (EPhR, § 246). And since occasionally he even seems to 
suggest that the best solution to this “disturbing problem which agitates the mod-
ern society” is simply to leave the poor to their fate, these claims were often read 
as a confession of Hegel’s manifest failure to construct a rational state. “This is the 
only time in his system where Hegel raises a problem—and leaves it open,” many 
scholars observed (here, typically, Avineri 1972: 154; recently also Ruda 2011: 31).
It is our contention that such a reading is profoundly flawed. The so-called in-
ner dialectic driving civil society beyond itself definitely includes colonization. Yet 
contrary to what is often assumed, it does not stop there. This imperialistic expan-
sion is only the first or immediate remedy for this specific society, which only dis-
places the contradiction in question but otherwise leaves it unchanged. This “high-
er deficiency in the concept” of civil society (GW 26: 504) consequently cannot be 
solved in this external manner, and Hegel knew it. It is rather “the concept” that 
has to “go beyond civil society.” This conceptual beyond of civil society is “the uni-
versal” or the state. In this sense, the rabble merely makes manifest the necessity 
of the conceptual transition of civil society towards the state, which alone has the 
strength to sustain its contradiction.19 
Besides, we believe that Hegel was actually too severe in passing his judgment, 
since, as we see it, corporations and the police had quite effective means at their 
disposal to suppress poverty and prevent the poor from developing the rabble 
mentality.20 To conclude this section, let us therefore briefly review the measures 
in question.
19  It may well happen that a particular state is not able to solve the contradiction in ques-
tion. According to Hegel, the state is not a work of art, but stands in the world, and as such 
it is subject to all the usual vicissitudes of the objective world. It is up to history to pass the 
final judgment, as Kervégan pointed out (see Kervégan 2007: 231).
20  This may appear confusing. On the one hand we claim that civil society necessarily 
sublates itself, but on the other hand we maintain that the police and corporations can, at 
least in principle, contain its destructive forces. In order to dispel the confusion we have 
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“Corporation” is once again an old name for a new concept. In Hegel, it does 
not have much in common with the medieval guild, but rather stands for an asso-
ciation that an individual may join freely on the ground of some substantial or du-
rable aspect, usually on the basis of a shared professional identity. This common 
feature, the fact that the members of a corporation pursue the same goals, gradual-
ly establishes a certain bond among them, so that they no longer constitute a uni-
versal family, but rather “a second family” (EPhR, § 252), as Hegel once again puts 
it with extreme precision.21 In this way, corporations abolish the equidistance that 
characterizes anonymous members of civil society, they create small circles within 
the great circle of civil society, and by developing a sense of solidarity, shared val-
ues, and a certain closeness among their members, they at least in part check the 
atomism inherent to civil society. For Hegel, corporations are of the utmost impor-
tance as they mark the first reappearance of the ethical life within what was called 
the loss of ethical life. But above all, corporations are supposed to enable him to 
provide for the poor in way that is free of the rabble effect. As we have seen, the 
problem with the police was that it was bound to act in a universal and external 
way, so that the support given to the poor was perceived as a humiliation. In cor-
porations, Hegel contends, this is no longer so. For now it is not the universal but 
the particular that helps the particular, so that the support given includes a sense 
of equality and even intimacy, just as in the family.22
Free corporations, which not only give material support but, more importantly, 
also facilitate social inclusion, thus at least in principle do offer a promising solu-
tion to the disturbing problem of poverty. However, already at the level of the po-
lice there are some rather capable measures that we think Hegel failed to consider 
adequately—in part, no doubt, because of the important changes in the economic 
structure of society, especially in relation to the enormous growth of the public sector 
compared to Hegel’s times. In this respect, let us mention but two such measures. 
First, we have seen that in civil society the production of common resources is 
essentially public, what is private is only the mode of sharing in them. This private 
distribution of commonly produced wealth is usually carried out on the model of 
market transaction, for instance through wages and payments. However, since the 
market is by no means a natural phenomenon but requires a complex set of regu-
lative and institutional conditions, which in turn affect the allocation of resources 
to remind ourselves that, for Hegel, there is an important difference between an element 
taken in isolation, as for instance within a judgment, and the same element integrated into 
a syllogistic mediation. As a mediating middle term of a syllogism, the element is modified 
by the extremes and changes its nature accordingly. Consequently, we have to distinguish 
between civil society as such and civil society as part of the mediating whole that includes 
the state. In fact, Hegel used precisely this example to illustrate the syllogistic mediation 
of the absolute mechanism (see GW 12, 144–145). For a closer examination, see Ross 2008.
21  There is, of course, a conceptual analogy between second family and second nature 
that cannot be discussed here. For a closer reading, see especially Schülein’s article “Die 
Korporation als zweite Familie in Hegels Theorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft” (Ellmers 
& Herrmann 2017: 101−116).
22  “Only those who live in the articular can take over the care for the particular,” Hegel 
notes (GW 26: 505). The comments by Gans (see Gans 2005: 197f.) make it clear that He-
gel most likely referred to trade unions, which, at that time, were largely prohibited. 
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achieved in this way, no such distribution can be considered natural. In this case, 
too, the result cannot be separated from the common framework that made it 
possible. Similarly, since according to Hegel the allocations achieved by market 
transactions include an element of contingency the extent of which is impossi-
ble to specify,23 it is equally impossible to maintain in any significant way that the 
market distribution is just, that it gives to everyone his or her fair share. On both 
accounts it follows that other modes of sharing in the universal resources could be 
designed which, while still in accordance with the basic principle of civil society, 
would nonetheless achieve a more equal distribution of wealth and guarantee sub-
sistence to every one of its members. 
Such a modified mode of distribution could become only more plausible once the 
obvious failures of the existing one are taken into account. For instance, since the 
most important factor in the production of universal resources lies in cooperation, 
that is, in the division of labor and therefore in the work as common, the existing 
market distribution disproportionally favors those who have, as a peculiar case of 
private-public partnership. We should also consider that non-remunerated work can 
nonetheless contribute to the production of public wealth; for that reason, a kind of 
universal basic income might well represent, in Hegel’s view, a deserved and there-
fore not humiliating reward for the socially useful work done by each member of 
civil society outside the market sphere. If someone would protest that such a pro-
vision might enable free riders to cheat society, this can be more than compensated 
by the element of contingency that is freely allowed for in the existing market order.
It has to be emphasized, again, that the above measures are not a matter of wealth 
redistribution. In order to be able to speak of re-distribution we would first need to 
have a system of distribution free of added elements, which would thus provide a 
neutral starting point. But as we have seen, in the economic field, the pure given is a 
myth.24 The arrangements leading to a more equal distribution therefore do not in-
fringe upon the existing system, but simply constitute a different one. In this respect, 
a particular role would have to be assumed by a well-designed system of taxation. 
Although Hegel does not speak much of taxes, they represent police material of vi-
tal importance. In our view, it is imperative to cultivate public awareness that taxes 
constitute the material infrastructure of the shared world and that those who seek 
to avoid paying taxes (Apple, for instance), even if this may be done in compliance 
with the letter of the law, thereby attack the very foundations of our living together.
And second, as we have seen, partaking in the system of needs also has forma-
tive effects. Since in civil society the needs are no longer natural, but abstract and 
always already socially mediated, they mold the individual in the direction of the 
universal. Required to be equal, the members of civil society imitate one another 
and actively “make themselves like others” (EPhR, § 193). If, therefore, the police 
is the face that, already on the level of civil society, the state shows to its members, 
then fashion (as the concrete form of the mores) is the face that its members turn 
towards the state, also already on the level of civil society. In this sense, fashion 
23  “This is subject to a complete entanglement of contingency of the whole” (GW 8: 244).
24  See, on this account, Murphy’s and Nagel’s The Myth of Ownership: “We cannot start 
by taking as given … some initial allocation of possessions—what people originally own, 
what is theirs, prior to government interference.” (Murphy & Nagel 2002: 9).
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constitutes an inverted complement of the police. This phenomenon demonstrates 
that the members of civil society are not completely separated after all, that they do 
constitute a kind of homogenized body with shared characteristics, and that they 
act una veluti mente ducti, as Spinoza would say, already at the level of the system 
of needs. This unity is ambiguous, to be sure, since it is in principle a unity of at-
omized selfish individuals.25 It does, however, furnish an objective reality that may 
facilitate the creation of a common way of thinking. In this way, the mere exter-
nal mechanism of civil society could sublate itself into the absolute mechanism of 
the second family, which would thus alleviate the problem of the rabble mentality.
III
Hegel was not alone in conceptualizing the police in his time. Alongside German 
philosopher Fichte, there was also the Scottish merchant Colquhoun, who wrote 
extensively on the “municipal police” and made himself famous by founding the 
first regular police force in England. Colquhoun was equally preoccupied with the 
problem of poverty and shared similar concerns with respect to what Hegel called 
the rabble. For instance, in his Treatise on Indigence, published in 1806—the year 
Hegel composed the Phenomenology of Spirit—Colquhoun initially stressed the need 
to draw a distinction between poverty, that “state and condition in society where 
the individual has … no property” and consequently “must labour for subsistence” 
(Colquhoun 1806: 7), and indigence, that “condition in society which implies want, 
misery, and distress,” when the individual is “destitute of the means of subsistence, 
and is unable to labour” (Colquhoun 1806: 8). “Indigence therefore,” Colquhoun 
observes, “and not the poverty, is the evil.” He acknowledges that the barrier be-
tween the two conditions is often “slender,” but it should be narrowly guarded all 
the same, since “every individual who retrogrades into indigence becomes a loss to 
the body politic” (Colquhoun 1806: 8). The proper task of the police is therefore to 
use “judicious arrangements” to prevent the poor “from descending into indigence.”
It is not hard to see that Colquhoun’s description has much in common with 
Hegel. This, however, is bound to make Hegel’s conception of the police suspi-
cious, for in Colquhoun’s case it is quite obvious that its task is not only to main-
tain, but to properly fabricate the social order. Furthermore, this order happens to 
be a very peculiar one, tailored according to the specific demands of capitalism. 
Colquhoun openly states that poverty is “a necessary and indispensable ingredi-
ent of society,” something desired, indeed, since “it is the source of wealth,” and 
without it “there would be no riches, no refinement, no comfort” (Colquhoun 1806: 
8). Therefore, if the proper task of the police is as much to prevent the poor from 
descending into indigence as to keep the poor in poverty, then its main objective 
is actually to create conditions where individuals would be forced to work,26 that 
is, to make the capitalist system run.
25  The ambiguous nature of formation within civil society was already emphasized by 
Ferguson, one of Hegel’s key references in political economy. See Varty 1997: 35−37. 
26  It is worth noting that—on different grounds, but nonetheless—something similar 
holds for Fichte as well. In his well-ordered state of understanding and necessity there 
would be no “chevaliers d’industrie” (Fichte 2000: 262). 
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Accordingly, Neocleous reads Colquhoun as the truth of Hegel’s police and 
speaks of “Colquhoun’s and Hegel’s joint commitment” to the modern commercial 
system and the demands of private property (Neocleous 2000: 59). The parallel is 
indeed disturbing. Yet, while it might be convincing in the case of late Foucault, as 
Neocleous equally suggests, in Hegel’s case it clearly misses the point.27 For Hegel, 
civil society was the sphere of individuals realizing their freedom as particulars. It 
constituted a sphere of freedom actualized. Yet, since there, in the sphere of equiv-
alent exchange, poverty implied the inability to start anything, to be poor meant 
simply that the “right had no existence.” Contrary to Colquhoun, Hegel designed 
his police provisions with the explicit intention to eliminate poverty, and if it still 
existed, the poor were justified in their indignation against society. For Hegel, as 
we have seen, property was not untouchable. Likewise, the purpose of the state was 
not to secure the safety of person and property—indeed, to claim something like 
this would mean to confuse the state with civil society (see EPhR, § 258R). Hegel 
explicitly conceived civil society as a sphere of the unpolitical within the political. 
Accordingly, civil society is not an end in itself that would dictate the conditions 
of a depoliticized state; quite the contrary, in Hegel, it is rather the political state 
that ultimately determines the concrete form of the framework that market econ-
omy has to adjust to.
In spite of this, we have to finally admit that the question of the police per-
sists. Due to the substantial change in the composition of civil society since He-
gel’s times, at least two major problems have emerged. One relates to corporations. 
In order to overcome the atomism of civil society Hegel introduced these small 
circles of solidarity that were based, primarily, on a shared professional identity. 
In present-day society, however, profession and work in general have lost their 
centrality in the individual’s life and thereby also the ability to forge one’s identi-
ty. Nowadays, one typically does not have a stable profession anymore, but drifts 
from one occupation to another, and work has ceased to constitute the privileged 
field of his or her activities. It is no longer unusual that personal convictions, ways 
of life, consumer choices, and even hobbies offer the traits used to determine our 
identity (see Ellmers & Hermann 2017: 14, 22; Ellmers 2015: 80, 151). But if this is 
so, then the present-day individual not only suffers from indeterminacy, as Hon-
neth put it, but also lacks any stable ground to even join a corporation. It does not 
seem that consumer behavior could replace a shared identity, as some have implied; 
yet contrary to other suggestions, for instance to form closer associations relying 
on the same place of residence (see e.g. Vieweg 2012: 337f.), this proposal at least 
seeks to solve the problem of civil society within its proper boundaries. In short, 
nowadays it is hard to see what could possibly perform the function that Hegel as-
cribed to free corporations.28
27  Neocloeus’ estimation of Hegel is rather strange, since he is one of the very few who 
actually read Hegel’s treatment of the police closely. See Neocleous 1998.
28  It seems that nowadays, due to the specific mode of subjectivation, the corporation 
needs to be non-exclusive, in the sense that an individual may have multiple memberships, 
and non-permanent, in the sense that one may easily change one’s affiliations. The prob-
lem is, however, that the very advantage that made the corporation instrumental—namely 
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The second problem refers to the relation between civil society and the state. 
Hegel, who lived in the Westphalian world order of sovereign nation states, spoke 
of civil society as if its members and state citizens were the same persons—that is, 
as if civil society and the political state, the state of understanding and the state of 
reason, physically coincided. Only in this way was it possible to use the notion of 
public authority in the sense of a common framework that included both realms at 
the same time. The problem is, again, that this joint has disintegrated: civil society 
and the political state have drifted apart. At least for the periphery it may be said 
that while the state is local, civil society is global (see Vieweg 2012: 327; Ellmers 
2015: 163). The framework order that regulates the functioning of civil society is 
increasingly determined outside the given state, even outside any state; similarly, 
the formative effects of civil society, its fashions and its upbringing towards the 
universal, no longer lead to the given political state, but somewhere else.29
As a consequence, the state no longer disposes with devices needed to regulate 
civil society and does not induce the attachment that once derived from the for-
mation process of civil society. In short, the state withers away. What remains is 
civil society pure, and its police. We are left with a police without a state, with a 
police that has assumed the role of the state. The interface of the universal with-
out the universal, the police as a state—this is the disturbing problem that should 
agitate our society.
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Zdravko Kobe
Međusklop opšteg: o Hegelovom pojmu policije
Abstract
Članak pruža probno čitanje Hegelove policije kao pojma koji predstavlja ključni test za 
umnost Hegelove države i koji zapravo igra veoma bitnu ulogu u formiranju njegovog mo-
dela umnosti. Na početku se razmatraju neke značajne promene u Hegelovom pristupu toj 
temi u jenskom periodu, posebno u vezi sa Fihteom i Spinozom; članak, zatim, iznosi Hege-
lovo poimanje policije kao međusklopa  onog opšteg u njegovoj poznoj političkoj filozofiji, 
zajedno sa njegovim obrađivanjem uznemiravajućeg problem siromaštva i ološa; i u zaključ-
ku, članak dodaje neke generalne primedbe o Hegelovoj policiji, nekad i sad.
Ključne reči: G. V. F. Hegel, J. G. Fihte, politička filozofija, socijalna filozofija, politička eko-
nomija, građansko društvo, policija, država blagostanja, korporacija
